Retail and wholesale gasoline prices vary over time and across geographic locations due to differences in government policies and other factors that affect demand, costs, and market power. We use a two-equation, reduced-form model to determine the relative importance of these various factors using panel data for 48 states over nine years. We find that the variation in the price of crude oil has been virtually the only major factor contributing to gasoline price variations during the 1990s. Tax variations and mergers contribute substantially more to geographic price differentials than do price discrimination, cost factors, or pollution controls.
Introduction
Facing concerns from upset motorists over dramatic gasoline price variations over time and large price differentials across states, U.S. policy makers have intervened in the wholesale and retail gasoline markets frequently. The cost of crude oil, environmental regulations, market power issues at the wholesale and retail level, and other concerns serve as lightening rods for government officials' outrage over gasoline price variations. We assess the degree to which government policies and the many factors that influence retail and wholesale gasoline prices account for price variations over time and across geographic areas. In particular, we examine the pass-through effects of crude oil prices and taxes, the chief factors in price changes and price differentials.
Recent articles investigate how specific aspects of the industry or regulations affect prices, such as the impacts of industry relationships and ownership structures, gasoline content regulations such as reformulated or oxygenated gasoline requirements, and retail sale restrictions such as limits on refinery ownership of retail outlets. Because these articles examine the effects of only one or a few factors that affect prices, they may suffer from omitted variable bias and hence misrepresent the relative importance of a particular element of the market in their policy conclusions. Moreover, most of this literature focuses on the timing of price changes rather than quantifying the relative contributions of various factors on retail and wholesale prices.
Our purpose is to include all major factors that affect prices so as to avoid omitted variable bias and to quantify the effects of the various factors as to why prices vary over time and across jurisdictions. Using a fixed-effects model based on panel data for the contiguous 48 states and the District of Columbia from March 1989-July 1997, we quantify how each factor contributes to prices and determine which price determinants generate the greatest variation in prices over time and by state and the degree to which changes in taxes and crude oil prices are passed through to consumers.
In the next section, we describe the factors that the literature has identified as influencing gasoline prices. We examine gasoline price differentials in the third section to quantify how prices vary. In the fourth section, we present our estimated reduced-form model, which shows how retail and wholesale prices depend on demand, cost, supply disruption, seasonality, gasoline content regulation, vertical relationship, merger and tax components. In Section 5, we provide a brief discussion of the pass-through effects of taxes and crude oil prices. We examine which factors are primarily responsible for price differences during the 1990s and across states and quantify the pass-through effects in Section 6. In the last section, we summarize our results and provide policy recommendations.
Related Literature
Determining the factors that influence gasoline prices has been the focus of much of the work on the gasoline industry. Early research emphasized the role of demand factors. Dahl (1986) and Dahl and Sterner (1991) provide detailed surveys of gasoline demand studies. They categorize the numerous demand models into those that include some combination of gasoline prices, income, vehicle characteristics, consumer characteristics and various lagged values of these variables using time series, cross-sectional or panel data. They argue for careful interpretation of vehicle characteristics, and they encourage the use of panel data. Espey (1996) uses a meta-analysis to determine factors that systematically affect gasoline price elasticities. She examines the same sort of factors as the previous work and concludes that some measure of vehicle ownership seems to be an important variable needed to prevent biased estimates of gasoline demand. She also finds that estimates of price elasticities of demand are fairly robust with respect to the use of state or national level data.
Much of the most recent work considering gasoline prices has investigated the impact of a specific characteristic of the industry. Several authors suggest that prices may vary due to market power in the industry. Borenstein and Shepard (1996) and Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) find evidence that wholesale and retail gasoline prices are functions of market power at the wholesale and retail levels of the industry respectively. Borenstein and Shepard (1996) test for collusion at the retail level, and find variation in retail prices consistent with tacit collusion. Shepard (1991) and Borenstein (1991) identify price discrimination in retail gasoline markets, and find that prices are a function of market power. Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2001) also support this conclusion.
To investigate the causes of market power in the gasoline industry, researchers have examined the vertical relationship between refiners and retailers. Gasoline retailers are either company (refiner) owned, lessee dealerships where a refiner leases a retail outlet, or independent (unbranded) operations. The type of retailer relationship may generate a principle-agent or double marginalization problem for the refiner. Barron and Umbeck (1984) find a small number of company operated retailers with prices lower than the lessee or independent retailers. Shepard (1993) , Rey and Stiglitz (1995) , and Slade (1998) examine the retail contract choice for refiners considering company ownership or lessee dealers. The different type of retail operations may face different objective functions, and as a result, price gasoline differently. Slade (1986) and Netz and Taylor (2002) both find evidence that independent retailers may increase retail competition and affect prices. Based on detailed station-level data, Hastings (2004) concludes that the market share of independent retailers significantly impacts retail prices, but refiner owned or operated market share does not.
The concentration of the industry may also affect prices. Hastings and Gilbert (2005) find that mergers at the refining and retailing levels can raise rivals' costs and significantly increase wholesale gasoline prices. Hendricks and McAfee (2000) provide evidence that refinery level mergers may significantly affect retail prices, but retail mergers may be less important.
The Federal Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990 specified gasoline content requirements for areas with air pollution levels above mandated thresholds. Brown, Hastings, Mansur, and Villas-Boas (2006) examine the effects of such regulations on wholesale gasoline prices. They conclude these regulations significantly increase wholesale prices. Chakravorty and Nauges (2005) and Muehlegger (2006) investigate similar content regulations imposed by various states. Again, they find significant increases in wholesale gasoline prices due to these regulations. Meuhlegger (2006) also includes unexpected refinery outages, when refineries unexpectedly stop production. He concludes that the price effects associated with refinery outages are more exaggerated in areas with content regulations.
Government restrictions on certain types of gasoline sales have been imposed to reduce predatory behavior. These laws may impact gasoline prices. Six states enforce divorcement laws, which ban gasoline sales through companyowned retail gasoline outlets. Some researchers suggest that refiners may act in a predatory manner against lessee-dealers if they are allowed to run companyowned retail stations. Barron and Umbeck (1984) find that retail prices at previously company-owned stations rose 6.7¢ for full-service stations and 1.4¢ for selfservice stations after the divorcement regulation became effective in Maryland. Vita (2000) finds that states with divorcement laws face retail gasoline prices that are 2.6¢ higher than those without such ownership restrictions.
In an attempt to protect smaller independently owned retail gasoline stations, New Jersey and Oregon continue to prohibit self-service gasoline retail outlets. Johnson and Romeo (2000) find evidence that restricting self-service stations has slowed the adoption of convenience store tie-ins and resulted in retail margins 3¢ to 5¢ higher in these states. Vandegrift and Bisti (2001) find that the ban in New Jersey decreases the rate of company-owned retail outlets and prevents price discrimination. Both of these effects may impact retail gasoline prices.
Taxes may play an important role in price variations. A few reduced-form studies examine gasoline tax incidence. Chouinard and Perloff (2004) conclude that federal gasoline taxes are nearly equally divided between consumers and wholesalers, while state specific taxes fall almost entirely on consumers. Consumers in states that use relatively little gasoline bear more state tax burden than consumers in states that consume more gasoline. Using panel data, Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore (2005) find that a gasoline excise tax is fully passed on to consum-ers within the first month of a tax change. Based on gas station-level data, Doyle and Samphantharak (2006) find that retail prices dropped 3% after the suspension of a 5% gasoline sale tax and rose 4% after reinstatement of the tax.
Many of the previously sited studies include crude oil prices as a determinant of wholesale and/or retail gasoline prices. However, none of these studies discusses the importance of crude oil prices to price variation. Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) find that retail prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices. Borenstein and Shepard (2002) find that wholesale gasoline prices respond with a lag to crude oil price. The focus of these two studies is on the sticky nature of retail and wholesale prices, not the total pass-through effects of crude oil prices on gasoline prices or the amount of variation in these prices due to crude oil price shocks.
Price Variation
Retail and wholesale gasoline prices vary over time and across states. Table 1 provides summary statistics for real retail and wholesale prices for the entire data set of monthly observations from March 1989 -July 1997 for all contiguous 48 states and the District of Columbia, the monthly averages over all states, and the averages by state.
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Average prices also vary across states. The largest difference in both retail and wholesale prices is over 80¢. The minimum retail price of 93¢ occurred in Georgia during January 1994 while the maximum, $1.76, occurs in Connecticut during October 1990. The minimum wholesale price was in Oklahoma and Mississippi at 46¢ during December 1993. The maximum, $1.30, was recorded in Vermont during October 1990. Georgia has the lowest average retail price for our time period at $1.10. Montana had the highest average price of $1.38. Texas had the lowest wholesale price at 69¢ while Vermont had the highest at 83¢. Figure 2 shows the retail price, and Figure 3 traces the wholesale price over time for several states. We see prices tend to move together over time for different states, but a consistent and relatively large price differential exists between some states. 
A Reduced-Form Gasoline Price Model
To examine the relative importance of various factors that affect gasoline prices by state and over time, we use a reduced-form model that is consistent with both competitive and noncompetitive behavior. We initially investigated a structural supply and demand model. However, the lack of substantial variation in many variables made estimating state-level demand and other structural equations impractical. To continue with the structural model would have required heroic assumptions. Consequently, we use a reduced-form model, which we believe adequately describes the market and provides reasonable results. A reduced-form model is often used in the literature examining gasoline prices (e.g., Vita 2000; Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm 2005) . Suppose the underlying model is a standard, market-level model of a potentially noncompetitive market. Let Q be demand, p be price, X be the exogenous demand shifters, W be the exogenous cost shifters, Z be exogenous market power shifters, and let v(Z) measure the degree of market power (ranging from competitive to monopoly). The demand equation is Q = D(p, X), the marginal cost equation is MC(W), and the market-level "optimality" equation (MR = MC) implies that p = (v(Z), X, W). We estimate the reduced-form specification, p = f(X, W, Z), which holds for any market structure, v.
The dependent variables, retail and wholesale prices, are the monthly average prices for regular unleaded gasoline in each state. The retail price is the price of gasoline sold to end users through retail outlets. The wholesale price is the average terminal price within the state, and is the average price of gasoline for resale.
Due to the vertical nature of the wholesale and retail markets, the inverse demand function of the wholesale market depends on the marginal revenue function of the retail market. Thus, the reduced-form equations for retail and wholesale gasoline include the same variables. We group the factors that affect gasoline prices into seven categories: demand, cost, supply disruptions, seasonality, gasoline content regulations, vertical relations and mergers, and taxes. The specific explanatory variables are chosen based on previous work examining the gasoline industry as discussed in section 2. Table 2 lists our variables, the units of measurement, means, and standard deviations. The dummy variables for each month, the 25 retail mergers, and the state refinery outages are not included.
We use the variables in Vita (2000) and Skidmore, Petlier, and Alm (2005) that presumably affect gasoline demand, including total population, 6 We also follow Vita (2000) and include the percent of licensed drivers between the ages of 20-44. 7 All annual data are linearly interpolated to generate monthly observations. Several researchers have also found that population density (population per square mile) affects gasoline demand. 8 These authors argue that a concentrated population may reduce travel demand and thus reduce gasoline demand. In addition, population density may be associated with retail outlet density, which may reduce the costs of transporting fuel to retailers. Both of these considerations would generate a negative relationship between population density and retail price. However, density may cause more traffic congestion, which increases fuel consumption. Additionally, densely populated areas often face higher land values. These two aspects of highly populated areas would result in a positive relationship between population density and retail price. Thus, we include the population per square mile for each state. The major cost variables include production and transportation factors. An important input in the production of gasoline is crude oil. To capture possible lags in adjustment or adaptive expectations about crude oil prices, we include the current crude oil price and lags as suggested by Vita (2000) and Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) . The domestic price of crude oil is the firstpurchase price (the price refiners pay) of crude oil per barrel in Texas. 10 In order 3 Income data is from U.S. Department of Commerce, "Total and Per Capita Income by State and
Region," Survey of Current Business, 1992 Business, , 1998 . We interpolate each state's real annual per capita income using the national trend to obtain monthly series. 4 Population over the age of 65 is complied by U.S. Bureau of Census http://www.census.gov/ popest/archives/1980s/80s_st_age_sex.html and http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s /ST-99-03.txt. 5 The stock of vehicles is documented by the U.S. Department of Transportation, "State Motor Vehicle Registrations," Highway Statistics. 6 The percent of licensed drivers is found at the U.S. Department of Transportation, "Total Licensed Drivers in Force in the United States," Highway Statistics, 1989 Statistics, -1998 The percent of licensed drivers between the ages of 20-44 is from the U.S. Department of Transportation, "Total Licensed Drivers, By Age," Highway Statistics, 1989 Statistics, -1998 . Because the number of licensed drivers categorized by age, are not available prior to 1990, we use the information for 1990 in 1989. 8 See Lin, Botsas, and Monroe, 1985; Vita, 2000; and Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm, 2005. 9 Population density is compiled by U.S. Bureau of Census, "Resident Population-States,"
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 10 Crude oil prices come from the Energy Information Administration's "Crude Oil Prices,"
Petroleum Marketing Annuals, 1989 Annuals, -1998 . Because each barrel of crude oil produces 44 to capture other important input costs for gasoline production we include the monthly average prime interest rate to account for capital costs. 11 To capture transportation costs, we also calculate the wage rate of truck drivers. 12 We use a dummy variable set equal to one during the Persian Gulf War and the few months following the fighting when oil production in the Middle East slowed (January through June 1991) in order to capture increases in cost from maintaining larger inventories of crude oil and gasoline due to increased uncertainty about deliveries. We also include a dummy variable for the six months prior to the war (June through December 1990) to capture the expectations and actions taken in anticipation of the war.
In addition to costs, the supply of gasoline may be affected by unexpected disruptions. These shocks to gasoline supply occur due to fires, explosions and other unexpected events that stop production at the refinery, known as refinery outages. We construct 10 dummy variables for each state that contains one or more refineries that experience an outage including California, Colorado, Indiana/Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington.
13 Dummy variables are used as outage indicators as the severity of each outage cannot be determined from the information available for our entire time period. Our time period includes 24 refinery outages. Each of the outage variables equals one for any months a refinery in that state unexpectedly experienced a production interruption. As Muehlegger (2006) reasons, each outage is considered to last only one month, as either the outage ends or compensation can be made in the supply chain to account for the continued reduced production. The variable also equals one for the states that receive gasoline produced in that state. For example, Texas refineries experienced six months with outages. The Texas refinery outage variable equals one for those six months for Texas, and all the gallons of petroleum product (Energy Information Agency, 1998), we obtain the price per gallon by dividing the price per barrel of crude oil by 44. 11 Interest rates are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Current Business Statistics," Survey of Current Business, 1990 Business, -1998 Truck drivers wages is calculated from the U.S. Department of CommerceRegional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/spi/. The salary disbursements for "Trucking and Warehousing" for each state are divided by the employment for the industry (number of jobs). The resulting annual per capita salary is divided by 2000 hours to yield an hourly wage for truck drivers. The wage for Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota and Missouri are not available for every year, so we linearly interpolated the available data. 13 We identified refinery outages for 1995-1997 from Muehlegger (2006) , and by searching regional and national newspapers for reports of outages for 1989-1994 using Lexis/Nexis. states supplied by Texas (Table 3) . The supply relationships presented in Table 3 are based on the relationships defined by Scheffman and Spiller (1987 Both demand and cost vary with temperature and over seasons. Demand curves shift to the right in warmer, summer months when more trips are taken. Because the demand for home heating oil rises during cold weather, refineries produce more home heating oil and more gasoline (which is produced jointly with heating oil). We include the number of heating degree-days as well as monthly dummy variables (December is the base month) to capture temperature and seasonal effects, following Scheffman and Spiller (1987) , Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997), and Vita (2000) . The heating degree-days measure is the total number of average daily degrees below 65 that occurs each month for the location of the main refineries serving an area, as Table 3 describes.
15
Some regulations require refineries to modify gasoline formulations to reduce air pollution. These gasoline content regulations affect market power, 14 The supply relationships described by Scheffman and Spiller (1987) are refined and updated by examining petroleum product pipeline capacities (National Petroleum Council, Petroleum Storage and Transportation volume 5 Petroleum Liquids Transportation, 1989) , and Muehlegger (2006) . 15 Heating degree days come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Local Climatological Data, 1989 -1997 efficiency, or both. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment requires certain regions of the country to use special formulations of gasoline at specific times to reduce the pollution generated by gasoline combustion. Starting in January 1993, these regulations required the exclusive, year-round use of reformulated gasoline in some major cities across a number of states.
16 Starting in October 1991, several states required that only oxygenated gasoline be sold during various winter months in some of their major cities.
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The requirement that stations sell only specially formulated pollutionreducing gasoline increases refining costs and may create market power for wholesalers within a state. To produce reformulated gasoline, refiners must make several costly modifications to their production equipment. If producers in surrounding states avoid incurring these large capital costs, producers in states mandating the use of reformulated or oxygenated gas do not face competition from these out-of-state suppliers. We include two variables to capture the effects of these regulations. We measure for each state, the percentage of the population subject to the reformulated and oxygenated requirements as suggested by Chakravorty and Nauges (2005) . This reformulated gasoline variable is set equal to zero for the time periods when states have different reformulated gasoline regulations or practices. Since the use of oxygenated gasoline is seasonal, this variable equals zero for the months when oxygenated fuels is not sold.
California, Illinois and Wisconsin have additional reformulated gasoline considerations. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has several phases of adjustment for the gasoline sold in California.
18 Phase I of the plan required some changes to gasoline additives, and prohibited the sale of leaded gasoline beginning January 1, 1992. Phase II requires the reformulated gasoline sold in California after June 1996 to meet different standards than the federal reformulated gasoline regulation. Illinois and Wisconsin both provide tax incentives for refiners to use ethanol-blended gasoline to meet the federal requirement. Thus, the gasoline sold in these two states varies from and is incompatible with other 16 The states requiring reformulated gasoline in some cities include California, Connecticut, Muehlegger (2006) . A dummy variable set equal to one for California beginning in January 1992 is included to capture the effects of Phase I of the CARB regulation. A variable is also included for Phase II of CARB regulation in California. This variable measures the percent of the population covered by the reformulated gasoline requirement. Similar variables for Illinois and Wisconsin are included for the time periods the states use ethanol-blends.
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Gasoline refiners and retailers may have market power. Figure 4 shows how the national markup of the retail price over the wholesale price and the markup of the wholesale price over the crude oil price vary over time. The vertical relationship between refiners and retails or mergers may affect market power over time. These vertical relationship variables may be endogenous. However, we include these vertical relationship measures, as we do not observe large variations in these variables over time, which suggests that we can treat these variables as largely predetermined.
Contractual arrangements between retailers and refiners may affect costs or the degree of market power and impact prices as studied previously by several authors. Three types of retail stations exist. First, a brand-name refiner (such as Shell or Exxon) may vertically integrate into retailing, where its stations sell only the brand-name gasoline at a price determined by the company. Second, a lease contract restricts the lessee to sell only the refiner's brand of gasoline and dictates many operational decisions, but the lessee determines the retail price. Third, open dealers may agree to sell a specific brand of gasoline, but the dealers make all operational and pricing decisions. To capture the effects of vertical relations, we include the national share of refiner-operated brand-name retail outlets and the share of retail outlets leased from refiners. The base category is the share of open stations. The contractual arrangement variables between the retailers and refiners are the national percentage of the 20 largest major branded retail gasoline stations that are operated under a lease contract, are operated by a vertically integrated company or are open dealers.
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Although no large, national merger occurred during our sample period, 6 refinery mergers occurred in California, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas, and 25 retail mergers took place in 18 states. Mergers and divestitures (henceforth "mergers" for short) could either lower prices by increasing efficiency or raise 19 The regional populations are found at the U.S. Bureau of Census at http://www.census.gov/ popest/archives/1990s/SU-99-07.html. 20 These ownership variables come from the National Petroleum News, National Petroleum News Factbook, How Oil Companies Handle Product Distribution, 1988 -1997 . These variables vary over time, but not across jurisdictions. 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Retail -Wholesale
Wholesale -Crude Oil prices by enhancing market power. We use 31 dummy variables to capture the effects of refinery and retail outlet mergers.
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For the refinery mergers, the dummy variable equals one for all the states that receive gasoline for retail sale from a state with a refinery merger (see Table 3 ) for the time periods after the merger effective date. For retail mergers, the dummy variable equals one only for the state where the retail merger occurs after the merger effective date.
Federal and many state governments apply gasoline taxes. During the sample period, the federal specific tax ranged from 11¢ and 20¢ per gallon. Many states imposed specific and/or ad valorem taxes to retail gasoline sales. The spe cific taxes varied from 7¢ to 36¢ per gallon.
22 Ad valorem tax rates ranged up to 7% of the retail price (which includes the specific taxes).
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Factors specific to each state may also influence gasoline prices, such as divorcement laws or the prohibition against self-serve stations. Although we can- 21 Mergers are tracked by Securities Data, The Merger Yearbook, 1989 Yearbook, -1998 The federal and state specific gasoline taxes are obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation, "State Motor-Fuel Tax Rates, 1984 -1999 Only California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, and New York apply ad valorem taxes to the retail gasoline price (Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1990 States, , 1992 States, , 1994 States, , 1996 . not identify the impact of these regulations individually, as they do not vary during our time period, we can include state dummy variables to capture these and other state-specific effects.
Pass-through Effects of Taxes and Crude Oil Prices
As is well known, the incidence of a federal specific tax in a competitive market is approximately η/(η -ε), where η is the national supply elasticity, and ε is the national demand elasticity. 24 Similarly, the incidence of a state-specific tax in State i is η i /(η i -ε i ), where state-specific elasticities are substituted for the national ones. Although, the elasticity of demand in a particular state may differ slightly from the national elasticity, presumably the main difference across states is in the elasticity of supply.
We would expect the burden of a federal specific tax to be shared more equally by consumers and wholesalers than would a state's specific tax burden. The elasticity of supply for a given state is substantially greater than for the nation as a whole. If the state-specific tax is relatively high in one state, wholesalers will move gasoline to another state with lower taxes. The ability of wholesalers to avoid taxes will result in consumers paying a larger portion of state taxes. (See Chouinard and Perloff 2004 for a formal analysis.)
The incidence of a state-imposed ad valorem tax also depends on the statespecific elasticities of supply and demand. As Delipalla and Keen (1992) and Besley and Rosen (1999) suggest, the effects of an ad valorem tax will differ from those of a specific tax. In an oligopoly market with constant marginal costs, free entry, and locally constant price elasticity, Delipalla and Keen (1992) show that specific taxes will result in larger price effects than comparable ad valorem taxes. They also prove that overshifting-price effects that exceed the tax-may occur with either specific or ad valorem taxes.
Were the downstream firms to use fixed-proportion production processes, the pass-through of crude oil prices would be similar to that of a tax for any given market structure. To the degree that variable proportion production processes are used, we would expect the pass through to be less, all else the same.
we can examine how prices vary over time and across states. Panel data have been used to examine the effects of one characteristic of the market on gasoline prices by several authors including Johnson and Romeo (2000) , Vita (2000) , Banfi, Filippini, and Hunt (2005) , and Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2005) .
We estimate linear, fixed-effects equations to explain why prices vary over time and across states. We reject the hypothesis of a random-effects model based on the Hausman model-specification tests (the p-values are 0.0 for the Chisquared test statistics for both the retail and wholesale equations). We use White's robust heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for all of the parameter estimates. The estimated equations fit the price data closely: The R 2 is 0.91 in both the retail-price and the wholesale-price equations. Table 4 reports the estimated reduced-form coefficients (except for the 25 retail merger dummy coefficients, 11 monthly dummies, the 49 fixed effect dummies, the CARB I and II regulations as these are not significant in either equation, and refinery mergers in 1993 and 1995 in Texas that do not significantly influence retail or wholesale prices) for the retail-price and wholesale-price equations and p-values based on ttests against a coefficient of zero.
We also estimated other specification for the price equations to verify the robustness of the results. We used a Box-Cox transformation to examine the possibility of nonlinearity in the explanatory variables. The estimated Box-Cox parameter in both equations is close to one, but not equal to one. 25 Although the Box-Cox parameter does not equal one, the coefficient estimates using the BoxCox transformation do not vary significantly either qualitatively or quantitatively from the reported linear model.
We completed several other tests of the parameter estimates to support the reported specification. To determine if prices vary by state or region, we examine regions that are delineated by oil and gasoline transportation routes (see Table 3 ). We tested and rejected the hypothesis that the state variables were equal within each region for all but two regions in the retail equation, and all but three in the wholesale equation. Thus, we allow for individual dummy variables by state rather than regional dummies. We also tested for seasonality: We reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the monthly dummy variables are equal. 25 The wholesale price equation Box-Cox parameter is 0.75. Estimated t-tests reject that the BoxCox parameter in the wholesale equation equals zero or one with p-values of 0. For the retail price equation, the Box-Cox parameter equals 1.1. The t-tests associated with whether the parameter equals zero or one yields p-values of 0 and .05. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** the 5% level; ***the 1% level.
Price Variation over Time
Figures 5 and 6 show our estimates of the relative impacts of various factors (evaluated at their national means) on wholesale and retail prices. In each figure, the predicted price line is closely surrounded by the dots reflecting actual prices. The "crude-oil" line shows the impact of the crude oil price and its lags on predicted retail and wholesale gasoline prices. Crude oil accounts for 56% of the predicted wholesale price and for 32% of the predicted retail price. The retailand wholesale-price lines are virtually parallel to the crude-oil price line because the effects of other variables are nearly constant when averaged over a year. In each figure, the "cyclical" line reflects the effects of variables that cycle over the year: the heating degree-days, the requirement to oxygenate gasoline, and the monthly dummy variables. The "all other" line reflects the effects of all the other variables. This line is virtually horizontal, which is not surprising because most of these variables vary more across states rather than over time. Thus, virtually the entire variation in national prices was due to changes in the crude oil price and cyclical fluctuations and not to changes in taxes, content requirements, and other factors. * The contribution of all other variables to the retail price. ** The contribution of current and lagged crude oil prices to the retail price. *** The contribution of heating degree-days, oxygenated gasoline requirements, and monthly dummy variables to the retail price. * The contribution of current and lagged crude oil prices to the wholesale price.
**The contribution of all other variables to the wholesale price. ***The contribution of heating degree-days, oxygenated gasoline requirements, and monthly dummy variables to the wholesale price.
Price Variation across States
We now examine which factors cause retail and wholesale gasoline prices to vary across states. The larger a variable's coefficient and the larger is its average value, the greater is this variable's average effect on prices. However, whether this variable causes substantial geographic differences depends on its range of values across states. Table 5 shows the average national effect and the range of effects across states for each variable in each equation. The columns labeled "mean" show how much on average each variable contributes to the average price level. This column contains the estimated coefficient multiplied by the average value of the variable. For example, the first row shows that population contributes 6.14¢ to the retail price and 1.25¢ to the wholesale price at national average levels. The mean of the monthly, refinery merger and retailer merger dummy variables are a sum of the average effects of the variables in each category. We indicate whether these means are statistically significantly different from zero. The constant contributes 41.83 and 60.53 cents to the retail and wholesale price respectively.
The "range" columns show how much of the variation in prices across states is explained by each variable (a statistical test of statistical significance would not be meaningful here). This column contains the largest difference of the state average of the variables multiplied by the estimated coefficient. (No range is included for variables that do not vary across states.) For example, the average retail price varies by 35.9¢, and the average wholesale price varies across states by 7.3¢ due to population differences. The range for the refinery and retailer mergers is the difference between the smallest and largest estimated coefficient on each type of merger. Since some of the merger coefficients are negative and some are positive, the ranges associated with the refinery or retail mergers represent the largest positive price effect less the largest negative price effect. The range for the CARB Phase I gasoline variable is the estimated coefficient. The ranges for the federal reformulated and oxygenated laws and the state-specific content regulations are the coefficients for the variables multiplied by the largest percentage of the population affected by the regulation. These represent the difference in prices between an area under the regulation and an area not affected by the laws. The population density and age distribution of a state's population appear to have the largest impact on interstate retail price differentials. All else the same, the population density and percent of the population over the age of 65 explain up to 26¢ and 19¢ respectively of the difference in retail prices across states.
State taxes also greatly affect retail prices. State-specific taxes generate a difference of almost 22¢ across states. Georgia had the lowest specific tax of 8.4¢ and Connecticut the highest, 31.3¢. State ad valorem taxes lead to price differences of nearly 9¢. Consumers in Mississippi with a high ad valorem tax rate of 6.42% paid 11.1¢ more at retail than states with no state tax.
Retail mergers create up to a 14¢ retail price differential across states, whereas refinery mergers caused a maximum retail price difference of nearly 10.5¢. A 1992 Washington state merger had the largest effect, increasing Washington and Oregon retail prices by more than 6¢. A 1996 merger decreased the retail price in California, Arizona and Nevada by 7.5¢. A 1991 refinery merger increased the California region retail prices by 9¢. A 1993 Texas refinery merger decreased retail prices in the area serviced by Texas about 1¢.
The content regulations also may play a role in causing state retail price differences. The areas with federal reformulated requirements may face average prices nearly 1¢ higher than those without the law, and the oxygenated areas have prices nearly 5¢ higher. The state-specific regulations are mostly not significant, but could substantially contribute to price variations. We find less of an impact on price variations from these regulations than Muehlegger (2006) , but his use of more detailed data may be more sensitive to these effects.
The factors that were most important in explaining average wholesale price variations mostly match those that explain retail patterns. The percent of population over the age of 65 and the population density cause prices to vary by nearly 30¢ each. Mergers also have a large impact on wholesale price differences. The largest effect is a nearly 6¢ wholesale price increase due to a 1992 Washington state retail merger. The 1991 California refinery merger increased the area's wholesale price by 5¢. Again, the content regulations generate wholesale price differences across areas with and without the requirements. The federal reformulated and oxygenated rules cause wholesale prices to differ by 2¢ and 4¢ respectively. The state-specific content regulations may also affect wholesale price ranges, but are often not significant.
Pass-through Effects of Crude Oil and Taxes
Having found that taxes and crude oil prices are important contributors to prices and price variation, we also examine the pass-through effects of each of these variables. A 1¢ increase in the federal tax results in a 0.75¢ increase in the retail price and 0.3¢ decrease in the price received by wholesalers. Consumers and wholesalers each pay three-quarters and one-quarter of the tax respectively.
As expected, virtually the entire incidence of a state specific tax falls on consumers. A 1¢ increase in the state's specific tax increases the price consumers' pay by 0.94¢. Wholesalers incur a price reduction of only 0.08¢. Similarly, a 1% increase in the state ad valorem tax is associated with a 1.26% increase in the retail price and a statistically insignificant 0.16% increase of the wholesale price.
Changes in crude oil prices have large effects on both wholesale and retail gasoline prices. In the steady state, a 1¢ increase in crude oil prices increase wholesale prices by 0.89¢ and retail prices by 0.86¢ over three months. Wholesalers face decreased revenue when crude oil prices rise. The pass-through to consumers from crude oil prices is not as large as with the state specific tax, as we predicted. We reject the hypothesis that the sum of the crude oil pass-through equals the state specific tax pass-through (p-value of 0).
Conclusions
Virtually the entire variation in national gasoline prices over the last decade is due to a rise in the price of crude oil. Although politicians and others blamed taxes, content laws, and market power, these factors did not substantially contribute to the price variation of gasoline. On average, the price of crude oil accounted for 56% of the predicted average wholesale price and nearly 32% of the predicted retail price. The other variables that affect these prices do not vary significantly over time. Any policy strategy aimed at reducing the variation of gasoline prices over time will have to address gasoline production and crude oil prices.
We find that retail gasoline prices vary across states primarily due to factors affecting demand, variations in taxes, content regulations, and market power.
States' specific and ad valorem taxes are a major cause of the cross-state variation in retail prices. States' specific taxes accounted for up to 22¢ per gallon of the retail price differential across states. Ad valorem taxes added another 9¢ to the variation. Federal content regulations contributed 5¢ of price variation across states. Some mergers increased market power and raised prices, while others increased efficiency and lowered prices. Retail mergers caused up to 14¢ of the cross-state price differentials, while producer mergers added another 10¢.
Demand factors, content regulations and mergers had the largest impacts on wholesale price variation across states, while taxes had little effect. Retail mergers contributed up to a 6¢ difference in wholesale prices across states, while refinery mergers added up to another 9¢.
The federal tax pass-through affects consumers and wholesalers. The state taxes are borne nearly exclusively by consumers, as predicted by theory. Crude oil prices increase retail and wholesale prices. Wholesalers bear some of the burden of these increased prices. Crude oil prices decrease wholesaler revenue by more than do state taxes, but less than do the federal taxes.
Eliminating state taxes would greatly reduce the variation in prices across state, but may cause financial issues in many state budgets. Additionally, eliminating the federal content regulations could reduce price variations, but may cause significant environmental damage. In principle, the most attractive approach to reducing price variations is to prevent those mergers that increase market power but not those that increase efficiency. Anticompetitive mergers have relatively large price effects. Of course, whether governments can prevent only "bad" mergers remains an open question.
